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TORTS - Extension of Implied Warranty and Negligence
Actions to Remote Purchasers of Realty - Keyes v. Guy Bailey
Homes, Inc., 439 So. 2d 670 (Miss. 1983).
On August 7, 1975, Troy Gerald Fulgram purchased a house
in Jackson, Mississippi, which was constructed by Guy Bailey
Homes, Inc. Fulgram later sold the home to Kathleen Keyes on
June 1, 1979. After moving into the house, Keyes discovered that
it had a cracked foundation.
Keyes filed suit in circuit court alleging breach of an implied
warranty in the construction of the house and negligent construc-
tion. Guy Bailey Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the
basis of lack of privity between the parties. The circuit court grant-
ed this motion and Keyes appealed. The Supreme Court of Mis-
sissippi reversed and held that the builder-vendor of a home may
be liable to second or subsequent purchasers on the basis of breach
of implied warranty and negligence.' The court thus abolished
the rule in Mississippi requiring privity of contract between the
builder-vendor and the purchaser of a permanent structure on real
estate in order to impose liability on the builder.2 In addition to
an analysis of the holding in Keyes, this note will discuss the de-
velopment of implied warranties in realty transactions, their de-
velopment in Mississippi, and the builder-vendor's liability to
subsequent purchasers on this theory.
BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT
Caveat Emptor
The common law doctrine of caveat emptor3 has played an im-
portant role in the development of the law governing transactions
in realty. It has served to "trap the unsuspecting vendee who has
failed, or was unable, to secure an express warranty."' In Mis-
sissippi, the doctrine was applied to cases involving patent defects'
as early as 1840.6 It was later stated that this rule did not apply
1. Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., 439 So. 2d 670, 671 (Miss. 1983).
2. Id.
3. "Let the buyer beware," or the general rule that a buyer must "examine, judge, and test for himself."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979).
4. Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty - Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541,
542 (1961).
5. Patent defects are obvious ones discoverable by a reasonable inspection. Latent defects, however, are
hidden defects not discoverable by the exercise of ordinary diligence in inspection.
6. Anderson v. Burnett, 6 Miss. (5 How.) 165 (1840). Patent defects are those discoverable by a reasonable
inspection. id. at 167.
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in situations where the vendor had used fraudulent means to con-
ceal the defect.' The issue of whether the doctrine should be ex-
tended to include latent defects was not addressed until 1923 in
the case of Mincy v. Crisler.8 In that case, brick foundation piers
were constructed over a ditch filled with timbers and dirt. Over
a period of time, the timbers rotted, causing the foundation of
the home to sink. The court held that the purchaser had a right
to presume that a reasonably prudent builder would not construct
a house in this manner."
The doctrine of caveat emptor has recently been attacked by
various writers and commentators calling for its demise in cases
involving realty transactions.1" The rationale proffered for the
elimination of this common law maxim is based on today's trend
toward mass production of housing and a greater awareness of
the need for consumer protection." As Justice Inzer noted in Oliver
v. City Builders, Inc.:
The common law maxim of caveat emptor was fundamentally based on the premise that
the buyer and seller dealt at arm's length and that the purchaser had means to gain infor-
mation concerning the subject matter of the sale equal to the seller. However, under modem
conditions this rule has no application to latent defects in products built or manufactured
by the vendor. Furthermore, the maxim of caveat emptor has been gradually restricted
and circumvented until it is now a mere shadow of itself. To apply the maxim to an inex-
perienced buyer of a new home in favor of an experienced builder would result in a manifest
denial of justice in many cases."
As a result of the disfavor of the doctrine there has been a rela-
tively recent trend toward the creation of various implied
warranties1" in the sale of realty.' Today, an overwhelming majori-
ty of jurisdictions recognize implied warranties in the sale of real
property.'"
Emergence of Implied Warranties
The implied warranty as applied to real estate transactions was
7. Halls v. Thompson, 9 Miss. (I S. & M.) 443, 482 (1843).
8. 132 Miss. 223, 96 So. 162 (1923).
9. Id. at 237-38, 96 So. at 163.
10. See, e.g., Bearman, supra note 4; Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of
Real Property, 53 GEO. L. J. 633 (1965); Schwartz, Defective Housing: The Fall of Caveat Emptor, 33 ATL.
122 (1970).
11. Demko, Caveat Aedificator - Home Builders Beware!, 71 ILL. B.J. 724 (1983).
12. 303 So. 2d 466, 469 (Miss. 1974) (Inzer, J., specially concurring).
13. An implied warranty is a "promise arising by operation of law, that something which is sold shall be
merchantable and fit for the purpose for which the seller has reason to know that it is required." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1423 (5th ed. 1979).
14. Comment, Implied Warranties in the Sale of Real Estate in Colorado: Rational Boundaries of the Doc-
trine, 53 U. COLO. L. REv. 137 (1981).
15. See, e.g., Cochran v. Keeton, 252 So. 2d 313 (Ala. 1971); Wawak v. Stewart, 449 S.W.2d 922 (Ark.
1970); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Tavares v. Horstmann, 542 P.2d
1275 (Wyo. 1975).
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developed in 1931 in the English case of Miller v. Cannon Hills
Estates, Limited. 16 There the King's Bench distinguished between
finished and unfinished homes, holding that when a purchaser con-
tracts to buy a house "in course of erection,"17 he is protected not
only by any express warranty that may be found but also by an
implied warranty that the house is to be completed in a work-
manlike manner.18 Although this type of implied warranty was
first applied in an American jurisdiction in 1957, "' Colorado be-
came the first state to recognize the existence of an implied war-
ranty in the sale of a completed house. °
Three basic types of implied warranty have been recognized
in cases involving real estate transactions: habitability, workman-
like construction, and that the house is built in compliance with
local building codes.' Perhaps the most common of these is the
implied warranty of habitability." The underlying rationale of the
implied warranty is to allow a purchaser to rely on a seller's skill
and judgment in purchasing an item, 3 when the seller has reason
to know the particular purpose for which the item is to be used.24
The function of the implied warranty in general is to "promote
high standards in business and to discourage sharp dealings.25
Following the Carpenter v. Donohoe26 case, many states aban-
doned the common law relic of caveat emptor and opted for the
implied warranty theory in imposing liability on builder-vendors. 7
Application of the implied warranty theory continued to gain wide
acceptance throughout the 1970's.28 To date, of those states that
have addressed the issue, only two states have refused to apply
some form of implied warranty to realty transactions.29
Mississippi's first recognition of implied warranties in the sale
of realty came about in the case of Oliver v. City Builders, Inc.30
16. [193112 K.B. 113.
17. Id. at 121.
18. Id. at 122.
19. Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957) (sale of an unfinished home).
20. Carpenter v. Donohoe. 154 Colo. 78. 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
21. Id. at 83-84, 388 P.2d at 402.
22. See Shedd, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: New Implications, New Applications, 8 REAL EST.
L.J. 291 (1980). This warranty is somewhat similar to the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
in the context of goods found in U.C.C. § 2-3 15 (1978).
23. 67 AM. JUR. 2D Sales § 472 (1973) (citing Price Brothers Lithographic Co. v. American Pack. Co.,
381 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. 1964)).
24. Garner v. S & S Livestock Dealers, Inc., 248 So. 2d 783, 785 (Miss. 1971).
25. 67 AM. JUR. 2D Sales § 460 (1973).
26. See supra note 20.
27. Shedd, supra note 22, at 295-96.
28. Id. at 298-99.
29. Amos v. McDonald, 123 Ga. App. 509, 181 S.E.2d 515 (1971); Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, 219
Va. 287, 247 S.E.2d 400 (1978).
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City Builders constructed a house for Jansing, who conveyed it
to Oliver more than two years later. Six months after he moved
in, Oliver began to discover cracks in the walls and floor. He
brought suit against the builder on the theory of "strict liability
in tort," asking the court to abolish the doctrine of caveat emp-
tor. The court rejected this argument, holding that the other juris-
dictions willing to abolish the doctrine of caveat emptor have
necessarily found an implied warranty running from the builder-
vendor to his original vendee.31 Writing for the court, Justice Smith
held that since Mississippi had previously followed the doctrine
of merger, there was no room for an implied warranty.32 However,
he was the only member of the court to subscribe to this view.
Five justices departed from his reasoning and agreed that as be-
tween the builder-vendor and his original vendee there existed
an implied warranty of habitability and workmanlike con-
struction. "
This reasoning was later followed in the case of Brown v. El-
ton Chalk, Inc. ," where the court, relying on the "Oliver implied
warranty," clearly articulated the grounds upon which a purchaser
may recover from a builder-vendor. According to Brown, a party
bringing an action under an implied warranty "must allege in his
declaration, inter alia, that (1) the house is new; and (2) that the
plaintiff was the first purchaser."35 Although the Mississippi
Supreme Court was clearly recognizing the implied warranty, the
resulting scope of the Oliver-Brown rule was very narrow.36
Extension of Implied Warranties to Subsequent Purchasers
The 1960's and 1970's saw wide acceptance of the implied war-
30. 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974).
31. Id. at 467.
32. Id. at 469. The court cited Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Cohn, 217 So. 2d 528 (Miss.
1969), Blaylock v. McMillan Farms, Inc., 214 So. 2d 456 (Miss. 1968), and West v. Arrington, 183 So. 2d
824 (Miss. 1966) for the proposition that "where parties to a transaction finally reduce its terms to an executed
writing, all negotiations and previous understandings are merged into the writing and the terms of the writing
will control." Oliver, 303 So. 2d at 469.
33. Id. at 469-70 (Inzer, J., specially concurring). Justice Inzer, joined by Justices Rodgers, Patterson,
Walker and Broom, stated that the common law doctrines of merger and caveat emptor did not "preclude an
implied warranty as between a builder-vendor and the first purchaser. An implied warranty arises by operation
of law and when it arises it cannot be destroyed or defeated by the mere passage of title . . . ." Id. at 470.
Justices Robertson, Sugg and Gillespie dissented, holding that privity of contract is not a requirement to an
action for damages by the homeowner against the builder-seller. The dissenters based their reasoning upon
the holding in State Stove Manufacturing Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), which eliminated privity
of contract as a requirement in suits by the consumer against the manufacturer of a product.
Id. at 470-73 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
34. 358 So. 2d 721 (Miss. 1978).
35. Id. at 722.
36. Only the first purchasers of new homes were protected, and not second or subsequent purchasers not
in privity with the builder.
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ranty theory in realty transactions." However, most of those states
that have recognized the implied warranty have, as in Oliver and
Brown, only allowed the first purchaser to recover.38 Thus, second
or subsequent purchasers are often deprived of essential protection.
In what has been described as a new trend of authority,39 a few
states have extended implied warranties to subsequent purchasers
not in privity with the builder."0 Among the first of these juris-
dictions was Indiana in the case of Barnes v. Mac Brown and Com-
pany, Inc."5 The plaintiff, upon moving into a house that he had
bought from the original purchaser, discovered cracks in the base-
ment walls and subsequent leaking. Upon appeal of a
motion to dismiss in favor of the defendant, the Supreme Court
of Indiana held the implied warranty of fitness for habitation should
extend to subsequent purchasers notwithstanding lack of privity
of contract. The court noted that the logic compelling a similar
change in the law of personal property "is equally persuasive in
the area of real property."42
In a more recent decision, 3 the Supreme Court of Arizona ex-
tended its holding in Columbia Western Corporation v. Vela,"
creating an implied warranty of workmanlike construction in favor
of first purchasers, to include subsequent purchasers as well. The
court explained that:
[Tlhe same policy considerations that led to [the Columbia Western] decision - that house-
building is frequently undertaken on a large scale, that builders hold themselves out as
skilled in the profession, that modern construction is complex and regulated by many govern-
mental codes, and that homebuyers are generally not skilled or knowledgeable in con-
struction, plumbing, or electrical requirements and practices - are equally applicable to
subsequent homebuyers. Also, we note that the character of our society is such that people
and families are increasingly mobile. Home builders should anticipate that the houses they
construct will eventually, and perhaps frequently, change ownership. The effect of latent
defects will be just as catastrophic on a subsequent owner as on an original buyer and
37. See supra notes 28 and 29 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971); Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d
654 (Fla. App. 1983); Sousa v. Albino, 120 R.I. 461, 388 A.2d 804 (1978); Brown v. Fowler, 279 N.W.2d
907 (S.D. 1979).
39. Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., 439 So. 2d 670, 671 (Miss. 1983); Note, Gupta v. Ritter Homes,
Inc.: Extending the Implied Warranty of Habitability to Subsequent Purchasers -An Honorable Result Based
on Unsound Theory, 35 BAYLOR L. REv. 670, 672 (1983).
40. Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 342, 678 P.2d 427 (Ariz. 1984); Blagg v. Fred Hunt
Co., 272 Ark. 185,612 S.W.2d 321 (1981); Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 1l. 2d 171,441 N.E.2d 324 (1982);
Barnes v. Mac Brown and Company, Inc., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976); Elden v. Simmons, 631
P.2d 739 (Okla. 1981); Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980); Gupta v. Ritter Homes,
Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979).
41. 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976).
42. Barnes, 264 Ind. at 229, 342 N.E.2d at 620.
43. Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d 427 (Ariz. App. 1984).
44. 122 Ariz. 28, 592 P.2d 1294 (Ariz. App. 1979).
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the builder will be just as unable to justify improper or substandard work. Because the
builder-vendor is in a better position than a subsequent owner to prevent occurrence of
major problems, the costs of poor workmanship should be his to bear."5
Despite this trend, most states have adhered to the privity of
contract requirement either judicially "6 or by statute' in refusing
to extend the implied warranty to subsequent purchasers. In Mis-
sissippi, however, the question of extension of implied warran-
ties continued to surface in the courts. For example, subsequent
to the Oliver and Brown decisions, Mississippi was once again
faced with'this issue in the case of Hicks v. Greenville Lumber
Company, Inc. 8 The plaintiff, a subsequent purchaser of the house
in question, sought recovery inter alia on the theories of negli-
gence and breach of implied warranties. The court, relying sole-
ly on Oliver and Brown, refused to extend protection to the plaintiff
on either theory. " Thus, the privity of contract barrier remained
a deterrent to implied warranty actions by subsequent purchasers.
Negligence
The privity barrier relating to implied warranty actions has also
had a significant impact upon actions based on the theory of negli-
gence." Prior to 1916, the general rule was that the original seller
was only liable to one in privity of contract with him, i.e., his
immediate buyer."' However, in 1916, Judge Cardozo's opinion
in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company had the effect of wip-
ing out privity as a requirement to maintain an action against the
seller-manfacturer of goods. 2
Although most states readily accepted the MacPherson rule,
45. Richards, 139 Ariz. at 245, 678 P.2d at 430.
46. Drexel Properties, Inc. v. Bay Colony, Etc., 406 So. 2d 515 (Fla. App. 1981); Brown v. Fowler, 279
N.W.2d 907 (S.D. 1979).
47. Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599 (1977) (construing CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-563a (1979) (what is now CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-121 (1981)). Other states with statutory warranties
include: Louisiana, LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2520 (West 1952); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327A.01-.07
(West Supp. 1979); New Jersey, N. J. REV. STAT. §§ 46:3B-1 to -12 (West Supp. 1979). The National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws included a section in the Uniform Land Transactions Act
which contains a warranty to subsequent purchasers similar to that fashioned by the courts (U.L.T.A. § 2-309(b)
(1975)). However, at this time no state has adopted this Act. Note, Builder's Liability for Latent Defects in
Used Homes, 32 STAN. L. REV. 607, 619 (1980).
48. 387 So. 2d 94 (Miss. 1980).
49. Id. at 95-96.
50. Negligence as a theory of products liability is the context in which negligence is discussed here. Gener-
ally, products liability refers to "the liability of sellers of chattels to third persons with whom they are not
in privity of contract." W. PROSSER, HORNBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 (4th ed. 1971).
51. Id.
52. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). That decision held the manufacturer liable to the ultimate pur-
chaser of an automobile with a defective wheel. The exception to the general rule requiring privity "[extended]
the class of inherently dangerous articles to include anything which would be dangerous if negligently made."
W. PROSSER, supra note 50, § 96.
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Mississippi was hesitant to do so." In the case of Ford Motor Com-
pany v. Myers,' the Supreme Court of Mississippi denied recovery
to the remote vendee of an automobile which was alleged to have
been defective. Basing its decision primarily on early Mississip-
pi precedent,55 the court held that the manufacturer could only
be liable to his immediate vendee.5" Thus, privity of contract re-
mained a requirement in suits by a purchaser against the manufac-
turer of a product. '
It was not until 1966 that the privity requirement was relin-
quished in negligence actions. The landmark decision of State
Stove Manufacturing Company v. Hodges" expressly overruled
Ford Motor Company v. Myers by stating that privity of contract
was not an essential element in a cause of action against the
manufacturer of a defective product.5 9 In that case, State Stove
sold a hot water heater to Orgill Brothers, a wholesaler. Yates
and Gary purchased the heater from Orgill and used it in the con-
struction of a home for Hodges. The hot water heater later ex-
ploded and destroyed Hodges' home. Although the court
exonerated State Stove on the negligence claim under Section 402A
of the Second Restatement of Torts,0 it accepted the reasoning
of the MacPherson doctrine in rejecting State Stove's privity of
contract argument. 1 Subsequent Mississippi cases have followed
this reasoning in similar situations.62
The State Legislature of Mississippi has also addressed the is-
53. Id.
54. 151 Miss. 73, 117 So. 363 (1928).
55. id. at 74, 117 So. at 363. The early Mississippi cases included Kilcrease v. Galtney Motor Co., 149
Miss. 135, 115 So. 193 (1928); W. T. Pate v. Westbrook Elevator Co., 142 Miss. 419, 107 So. 552 (1926);
and Vicksburg v. Holmes, 106 Miss. 234, 63 So. 454 (1913).
56. Ford, 151 Miss. at 73, 117 So. at 363. The court noted in dictum that privity of contract might not
be required if the product was a dangerous instrumentality per se. Id.
57. The only settled exception to this general rule was in food and beverage cases. For example, in Bieden-
ham Candy Co. v. Moore, 184 Miss. 721, 186 So. 628 (1939), the plaintiff discovered part of a dead mouse
in a bottle of beverage. The court held that a bottler of beverage impliedly warrants that the beverage "is whole-
some and fit for human consumption" and that this warranty inures to the ultimate consumer. id. at 726-27,
186 So. at 629. Also, in Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927), the court
found the manufacturer liable for injuries resulting from broken glass in a bottle of Coca-Cola. The court held
that a manufacturer impliedly warrants that bottled beverages are pure and wholesome and that a contractual
relationship with the manufacturer is not a requirement. Id. at 883, 111 So. at 306.
58. 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966).
59. Id. at 116-18. Mississippi became the last state to adopt some form of the McPherson doctrine.
60. Id. at 121-23. The cour found no liability because the water heater was not in "a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or his property," it reached Hodges "without substantial change"
in its condition when sold, and the proximate cause of the explosion was attributed to Yates' and Gary's negli-
gent installation. Id. at 121.
61. Id. at 115-18.
62. See, e.g., Hamilton Fixture Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 285 So. 2d 744 (Miss. 1973) (manufacturer found
strictly liable for defective humidifier); Ford Motor Co., Inc. v. Cockrell, 211 So. 2d 833 (Miss. 1968) (manufac-
turer found strictly liable for latent defect in truck wiring system).
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sue of privity by enacting Section 11-7-20 of the Mississippi Code.
Approved in April, 1976, this section effectively abrogates the
requirement of privity of contract in actions brought under the
theories of negligence, strict liability and breach of warranty."
Perhaps the only area in which privity continued to retain vi-
tality was in real estate transactions. In addition to asserting breach
of implied warranty as a basis of liability in the Hicks case, the
plaintiff also asserted negligent construction of the house."
However, as with the implied warranty argument, the court held,
in effect, that privity was a necessary requirement to this type
of action as well.
ANALYSIS
In Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc. ,6 the Mississippi Supreme
Court was once again faced with the issue of whether to extend
actions based upon implied warranty and negligence to subsequent
purchasers of real estate. A split court decided to abrogate the
requirement of privity of contract theretofore followed and to em-
bark upon a new frontier, inhabited by only a few jurisdictions.67
The court did not, however, follow the reasoning of the dissent
in Oliver;61 instead, it based its decision upon certain policy
considerations69 because of what it viewed as a growing trend of
authority. '
The court noted that for the nine years prior to the Keyes case,
the Oliver, Brown and Hicks line of cases was the controlling
precedent. Although Oliver recognized an implied warranty to
the first purchaser, it did not extend protection to subsequent pur-
63. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 (Supp. 1984).
64. Hicks v. Greenville Lumber Co., Inc., 387 So. 2d 94 (Miss. 1980).
65. Id. at 95-96. Some jurisdictions have extended negligence actions without privity of contract. See, e.g.,
Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983); McMillan v. Brune-Harpenau-Torbeck
Builders, Inc., 8 Ohio St. 3d 3, 455 N.E.2d 1276 (1983); Newman v. Tualatin Dev. Co., Inc., 287 Or. 47,
597 P.2d 800 (1979); Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
66. 439 So. 2d 670 (Miss. 1983).
67. See supra notes 39 - 42 and accompanying text.
68. Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466, 470 (Miss. 1974) (Robertson, J., dissenting). Justice
Robertson insisted that the court had previously answered the question of privity of contract in the case of
State Stove by purportedly following the McPherson doctrine. Id. In order for this argument to be persuasive,
one must analogize building a house to manufacturing a product. However, this argument is not without merit.
In Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
We consider that there are no meaningful distinctions between [the] mass production and sale of homes
and the mass production and sale of automobiles and that the pertinent overriding policy considera-
tions are the same. That being so, the warranty or strict liability principles . . . should be carried
over into the realty field . ...
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 90, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965).
69. See, e.g., note 76, infra.
70. Keyes, 439 So. 2d at 671-72.
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chasers. One of the reasons offered by the court for the outcome
in Oliver dealt with the unique transaction that takes place be-
tween a builder and his purchaser. The court reasoned that since
the purchaser may, for economic or other reasons, be willing to
accept sub-par construction or waive defects, "[i]t would be strange
indeed if, when the original purchaser conveyed the property to
another, that his vendee could resort to the builder for damages
for deficiencies in workmanship or materials which the original
purchaser from the builder had accepted."71 Basically, the court
was stating that the builder and his vendee should have the right
to bargain for a lower standard of quality of construction.
This reasoning is unsound. To allow the builder and his pur-
chaser to bargain for a lower standard of quality would be to allow
shoddy construction of homes, which is what implied warranties
are designed to protect against by holding the builder account-
able for his work." Since it is very likely that the home will be
sold to another within the first few years after construction," it
would be poor policy to allow the builder to escape liability merely
because his purchaser sold the house to another. The purchaser
of a used home relies upon the workmanship of the builder as
does the first purchaser, although his "reliance diminishes as the
house ages and [his] expectations decline."7"
The main thrust behind an implied warranty is to afford pro-
tection to a purchaser for latent defects.'5 Under the Oliver reason-
ing, the first purchaser could readily accept some patent defect
in the construction of a house, but a latent defect might indeed
be unacceptable to him."6 In such cases, the first purchaser can
rely on the implied warranty to avoid financial catastrophe. Since
the defect might not arise until after the first purchaser has sold
to another, the subsequent purchaser should have the same pro-
tection as the first purchaser, provided he buys the home within
the period of time when the first purchaser could still benefit from
the implied warranty."'
The departure from the Oliver line of cases is an equitable so-
71. Oliver, 303 So. 2d at 468.
72. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 736 (Wyo. 1979).
73. Redarowicz, 92 111. 2d at 185, 441 N.E.2d at 331; Comment, Extension of Implied Warranties to Subse-
quent Purchasers of Real Property: Insurance Company of North America v. Bonnie Built Homes, 43 Omo
ST. L.J. 951, 967 (1982).
74. Note, Builders'Liability for Latent Defects in Used Homes, 32 STAN. L. REv. 607, 622 (1980).
75. Barnes v. Mac Brown and Co., Inc., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976).
76. "Often a buyer is willing to accept certain deficiencies in a house in exchange for a lower purchase
price. However, a buyer cannot be expected to discover structural defects which remain latent at the time of
purchase." Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1045-46 (Colo. 1983).
77. See Note, supra note 74, at 623.
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tion to the problem previously faced by subsequent purchasers
of realty. As the court in Keyes noted, there is "no reasonable
justification" for distinguishing between first and subsequent pur-
chasers of realty.78 Instead, there are valid policy reasons for ex-
tending implied warranty and negligence actions to remote
purchasers.
The most compelling policy reason offered by the court is
preventing the financial catastrophe of an innocent purchaser.'
Although a new home in many instances will be more expensive
than one previously occupied, the potential catastrophic outcome
is equally severe in cases involving used homes.8" Allowing
recovery to the first and not the subsequent purchaser results in
a manifest injustice, "a wrong without a remedy."8 1 Neither the
first nor a subsequent purchaser is in a position to monitor the
construction of a house or to detect latent defects. The subsequent
purchaser cannot rely upon his seller, "who lacks the knowledge
and skill of the builder, to sell a well-constructed dwelling." 2 Con-
sequently, "[he] must . . . rely upon the honesty and expertise
of the builder"8" to construct a home in a workmanlike manner
and fit for habitation. It is this reliance by one party on the other
that necessitates an implied warranty.
Arguments Against Extension of Implied Warranties:
Legislative Deference
Many state courts have based their refusal to extend implied
warranty and negligence actions upon deference to that branch
of government they feel best able to cope with it - the legislative. '
78. 439 So. 2d at 672.
79. Id. at 671-72.
80. See Note, supra note 74, at 622. The court quoted the Wyoming Supreme Court to illustrate the poten-
tial injustice of such a rule:
Let us assume for example a person contracts construction of a home and, a month after occupying,
is transferred to another locality and must sell. Or let us look at the family which contracts construc-
tion, occupies the home and the head of the household dies a year later and the residence must, for
economic reasons, be sold. Further, how about the one who contracts for the construction of a home,
occupies it and, after a couple of years, attracted by a profit incentive caused by inflation or otherwise,
sells to another. No reason has been presented to us whereby the original owner should have the benefits
of an implied warranty or a recovery on a negligence theory and the next owner should not simply
because there has been a transfer. Such intervening sales, standing by themselves, should not, by any
standard of reasonableness, effect an end to an implied warranty or, in that matter, a right of recovery
on any other ground, upon manifestation of a defect. The builder always has available the defense
that the defects are not attributable to him.
Keyes, 439 So. 2d at 672 (quoting Moxley, 600 P.2d at 736).
81. Id. at 672.
82. See Note, supra note 74, at 622. The implied warranty theory is inapposite because the nonbuilder-
seller is on equal footing with the purchaser.
83. Keyes, 439 So. 2d at 672.
84. See, e.g., Strathmore Riverside v. Paver Development Corp., 369 So. 2d 971, 973 (Fla. App. 1979);
Insurance Company of North America v. Bonnie Built Homes, 64 Ohio St. 2d 269, 271, 416 N.E.2d 623,
625 (1980).
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Louisiana, Minnesota, New Jersey and Connecticut are examples
of those states that incorporate warranties by statute.8" However,
it has been stated that "the courts should not be reluctant to im-
pose liability through an extension of either the implied warranty
or strict liability in tort" in states where the legislature has failed
to respond.86
In Keyes, however, the court felt that the Mississippi Legisla-
ture had already addressed the privity issue by enacting Section
11-7-20 of the Mississippi Code. " According to the court, it was
the intent of the legislature to "remove the privity requirement
in all cases.""' The court took what it read as the legislative intent
of Section 11-7-20 and judicially abolished the privity require-
ment in realty transactions. Therefore, the Keyes decision was
not inconsistent with the general intent of the legislature expressed
in Section 11-7-20.
Unfair Surprise to the Building Industry
In his dissent in Keyes, Justice Walker expressed concern over
the fact that the court was acting without adversary or amicus cur-
iae briefs. It was his belief that the case would "[change] the rule
in the middle of the game as to those home builders who built
homes prior to the enactment of Section 11-7-20 on April 27,
1976. ''89 This appears to be a meritorious argument, since the
builder-vendor's potential liability is increased while he has not
had an opportunity to insure against it. However, not all rule
changes require a "grace period" to allow those affected to take
appropriate measures to guard against potential liability.
In examining the effect of the rule change, the first determina-
tion is whether the rule is primary or remedial.90 When changing
a primary rule, it may be necessary to allow a period of time be-
fore enforcement commences so that those affected can make any
needed arrangements to prepare for "new exposure to suit."91 The
court in Keyes illustrated this point by referring to the case of
85. See supra note 47.
86. See Note, supra note 74, at 609. It has been stated that the building industry's strong lobby would prob-
ably prevent passage of a statute that extends liability of builders. See Comment, supra note 73, at 965.
87. 439 So. 2d at 673. The statute reads as follows: "In all causes of action for personal injury or property
damage or economic loss brought on account of negligence, strict liability or breach of warranty, including
actions brought under the Uniform Commercial Code, privity shall not be a requirement to maintain said ac-
tion." Miss. CooE ANN. § 11-7-20 (Supp. 1982).
88. Keyes, 439 So. 2d at 673.
89. Id. at 674.
90. Remedial rules are those "which pertain to or affect a remedy," whereas primary rules are "those which
affect or modify a substantive right or duty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1162-63 (5th ed. 1979) (quoting Per-
kins v. Williamette Industries, Inc., 273 Or. 566, 571 n.I, 542 P.2d 473, 475 n.1 (1975)).
91. Keyes, 439 So. 2d at 672.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Pruett v. City of Rosedale,9" where the Mississippi Supreme Court
abolished immunity from tort suits that had previously been
granted to state and administrative agencies. Since these agen-
cies would be liable for the first time for failure to exercise
reasonable care when performing their duties, "unfair surprise"
considerations forced the court to apply the rule change prospec-
tively to allow those agencies to secure liability insurance and take
other appropriate measures to guard against potential liability.93
On the other hand, there is no need for only prospective appli-
cation of a remedial rule change because the rules that govern
the activity of those affected are not changed (i.e., the underly-
ing duty remains the same). The court noted that in the case of
Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio,9" the remedial change was
to allow punitive damages for the first time in chancery court.9"
Since punitive damages had always been allowed in cases of gross
negligence, there was no need for prospective application of the
rule change.96
The court in Keyes decided that the rule being changed was
remedial and the building industry would not suffer from unfair
surprise.97 In reaching this decision, the court offered this
reasoning:
The builder already owes a duty to construct the home in a workmanlike manner and to
construct a home which is suitable for habitation. If we extend potential liability of the
builder to subsequent purchasers, the builder still is burdened only with the duty to con-
struct the home in a workmanlike manner, etc. In other words, no greater effort will be
imposed on the builder to protect himself. This change will not affect the primary rules
by which his activity is governed. Instead, the remedial rule will be enlarged to strengthen
enforcement of the so-called primary rule - the duty to construct the home in a workmanlike
manner."
Justice Prather, writing for the court, used the same reasoning
with respect to negligence actions. Since a builder is required to
exercise reasonable care in the construction of buildings, exten-
sion of liability to remote purchasers will impose no greater duty
upon builders: they must still exercise reasonable care.99
In summary, extending implied warranty and negligence ac-
92. 421 So. 2d 1046 (Miss. 1982).
93. Keyes, 439 So. 2d at 672.
94. 431 So. 2d 454 (Miss. 1983).
95. Keyes, 439 So. 2d at 672.
96. The only change was an enlargement of the types of courts in which one may be reprimanded. Keyes,
439 So. 2d at 672-73. "In short, no citizen . . . is going to engage in conduct which would subject him to
an assessment of punitive damages in reliance upon the rule we abandon here." Tideway Oil, 431 So. 2d at 466.
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tions to subsequent purchasers does not require a change in the
builder's basic rights or duties. As the Supreme Court of Texas
recently stated: "In our very mobile society a builder/seller should
know a house he builds might be resold within a very short peri-
od of time; therefore, our extension of the implied warranty should
not place any extra burdens on builders. 10 0
Limitations
Of those states which have extended implied warranties to sub-
sequent purchasers, most of them have imposed limitations upon
the type of defect covered and the period of time within which
to bring an action. Most courts have stipulated that the defect must
be latent,10 ' which requires that the purchaser make a reasonable
inspection. Although the court in Keyes did not specifically state
that the warranty was limited to latent defects, it was implicit by
virtue of its prior holdings. 102
The standard of reasonableness is generally used in determin-
ing the period of time within which an action must be brought
for breach of an implied warranty.0 3 In Mississippi, however,
this period of time is statutorily fixed at ten years.0 4 Although
this period of time had previously been shortened if the original
purchaser sold to another, the court in Keyes held that Section




Prior to Keyes, Mississippi adhered to the concept of privity
of contract in order for one to assert an implied warranty or negli-
gdnce claim arising from a transaction in realty. As a result, sub-
sequent purchasers did not have a cause of action for faulty
construction. By abolishing the privity of contract requirement,
the court in Keyes extended protection to those no less deserving
than the first purchaser of the house. This case simply reflects
the reality of today's housing industry in general. The mobility
of society and large scale construction of houses makes the builder-
100. Gupta v. Ritter Homes. Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. 1983) (Spears. J., concurring).
101. See, e.g., id. at 169; Redarowicz, 92 I11. 2d at 183-85, 441 N.E.2d at 330-31.
102. Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466, 469 (Miss. 1974) (Inzer, J.. specially concurring); Min-
cy v. Crisler. 132 Miss. 223, 96 So. 162 (1923).
103. Moxtey, 600 P.2d at 736.
104. Miss. COOE ANN. § 15-1-41 (Supp. 1982).
105. 439 So. 2d at 673.
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purchaser relationship closely resemble that of manufacturer-
consumer."° Thus, it is incumbent upon courts to "fashion some
legal framework in which to protect innocent purchasers. 1 7 The
Keyes case accomplishes this end.
The result in Keyes was reached by expressly overruling three
prior cases on the issue of privity of contract. Although it may
be desirable to adhere to precedent, "a judicious reconsideration
of precedent cannot be as threatening to public faith in the judiciary
as continued adherence to a rule unjustified in reason, which pro-
duces different results for breaches of duty in situations that can-
not be differentiated in policy.""
Mel Knotts
106. Perhaps Justice Robertson's dissent in Oliver was well founded after all in regard to his analogy of
houses to manufactured products in the context of products liability. See supra note 33, which clarifies the
Oliver holding, and note 68, pertaining particularly to Justice Robertson's dissent in Oliver.
107. Keyes, 439 So. 2d at 672.
108. ThLeway Oil, 431 So. 2d at 467 (quoting Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 405 (1970)).
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